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ABSTRACT 
 
Sharing data that contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, such as medical 
records, always has privacy and security implications. The issues can become rather complex 
when the methods of access can vary, and accurate individual data needs to be provided whilst 
mass data release for specific purposes (for example for medical research) also has to be 
catered for. Although various solutions have been proposed to address the different aspects 
individually, a comprehensive approach is highly desirable. This paper presents a solution for 
maintaining the privacy of data released en masse in a controlled manner, and for providing 
secure access to the original data for authorized users. The results show that the solution is 
provably secure and maintains privacy in a more efficient manner than previous solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sharing and exchanging of large amounts of data can be essential in responding efficiently and 
effectively to critical situations such as bush fires, earthquakes or medical emergencies. However, 
privacy and security issues continue to be major barriers, since revealing sensitive data over the 
Internet can present a serious threat. Digitally stored medical data accessed by an unauthorised 
person, or uncontrolled transfer of medical data related to an individual’s health condition and 
medications can lead to major problems with both short term and long term implications. For 
example, if the information is collected by an insurer or by the patient’s employer, the patient 
may subsequently find that she is unable to obtain insurance or has lost her job. 
 
There may be many interpretations of ‘data privacy and security’. Here, by privacy we mean the 
‘inability to deduce the identity of an individual from the data presented about that individual’, 
while in case of security we focus on confidentiality.  
 
In the research literature, the existing solutions for maintaining data privacy are based on 
determining how to reduce the probability of an individual’s identity discovery when a large 
amount of private data is shared in an online environment. But, there is always a trade-off 
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between privacy loss and information loss, and to preserve the accuracy of results and to reduce 
loss of information, a number of techniques have been developed. Most existing solutions focus 
on data modification [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [6], which requires that the data be altered before its 
release. However, this may consequently reduce data accuracy. In addition, such solutions 
overlook the possibility of security breaches in which whole sets of (modified) data may be 
intercepted in transmission and read or altered.  
 
Our objective is to provide data confidentiality and privacy in an efficient protocol. While a 
number of widely-used communication protocols are available to provide security in the transport 
layer and below, upper-layer security protocols need to be tailored to the application, and no 
general solutions are available. However, solutions in the application layer can protect data within 
the user equipment as well. 
 
This paper presents an efficient application-layer solution for data privacy and confidentiality 
along the path from the database to the user application. It can be combined with lower-layer 
techniques to provide additional features, such as authentication, but at the expense of efficiency, 
as that may require more resources, such as certificate handling or public-key infrastructure (PKI) 
in general. Efficiency is further improved by selective encryption: only privacy-protected data is 
given additional, confidentiality protection. This prevents access by unauthorised users, while 
reduces the probability of subject identification by authorised users. The solution is intended for 
health-care data, and the target of protection, medical information, is clearly identified in the 
application. 
 
We describe a data privacy architecture which, when compared to existing solutions, improves on 
or matches previous data privacy research both in the retention of privacy and in the efficiency of 
the protocol, and which in addition guarantees security against some of the more common attacks 
on data.  
 
1.1.Contributions 
 
This paper proposes a method which efficiently reduces the overhead and maintains levels of 
security and privacy of sensitive information in an online environment without compromising 
data accuracy. We demonstrate that the architecture proposed in this paper overcomes the 
drawbacks of existing solutions by effectively maintaining levels of security while reducing the 
time complexity of other solutions. In particular, we show that the proposed method demonstrates 
increased speed of encryption/decryption and reduces overhead when compared to several recent 
privacy-preserving solutions; it does this without compromising on data privacy, accuracy or 
security of transmissions between sender and receiver. We also show that this privacy model 
outperforms the best competing privacy models in its ability to maintain data privacy. 
Our specific contributions are: 
 
• A privacy preservation method for personally identifiable data, which provides low 
identification probability with low overhead cost. 
• A demonstrably efficient encryption method for releasing sensitive data. 
• Proofs that our method is secure against several standard attacks on data. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we give the background on 
contributions made by existing solutions. Section III details the proposed architecture. Section IV 
presents the experimental setup, analysis, simulation results of the proposed architecture, 
comparison with analogous data on existing solutions and security analysis; Section V presents 
proofs of security. Section VI concludes the paper with a summary and discussion of future 
directions of our work. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
In the literature, several methods have been described for preserving the privacy of individuals 
when publishing data; simulation [1], noise addition [2], micro aggregation [3], randomization 
and perturbation methods [4], [5] and [6] are some prominent examples. These algorithms modify 
the initial data in order to preserve privacy while still providing usable data. However, 
modification to the original data needs to be performed carefully, as large modifications may lead 
to loss of important information, while minor changes may not be sufficient to protect privacy [7].  
 
One of the oldest solutions to protecting privacy of digital data is known as k-anonymity [8]. The 
basic principle involved is that for any piece of data released, there are at least k-1 other pieces of 
data released at the same time which are indistinguishable from the initial one in terms of 
attributes. Hence, the probability of correctly identifying an individual in the data set is at most 
1/k. It is very rare that all personally identifiable information in any given data set satisfies k-
anonymity, and data may need to be adapted before being released in order to achieve this status. 
In [8], the ideas of ‘generalization’ and ‘suppression’ [9] are used to achieve k-anonymity. 
Generalization replaces values with values that are semantically consistent but different from the 
original. For example, a specific age might be replaced with an age range. In suppression some 
data is not released at all. 
 
In [10], data linkage is made more difficult by the addition of fake patient data to the original data 
set. The amount of fake data to be added is a function of the diversity of the data to be privatized; 
the more diverse the data, the more fake data is added. This approach has the disadvantage of 
having to manage or transmit larger data sets than necessary. 
 
Since k-anonymity and its generalizations were deemed to work only with certain data attributes, 
and failed to maintain the privacy of others, researchers began to look for better methods. The 
algorithm in [11] numerically transforms the original data first by grouping and then by applying 
a method that keeps relationships between data items while obfuscating the real values. In the 
transformation process the entire data value domain is split into categories and each category is 
assigned a number. Each data item is put in a category and a membership value within the 
category is assigned. Then a new, transformed value is calculated by concatenating the category 
number and the membership number. However, the applicability of this method is limited to cases 
when the actual value of the original data is not important, such as in some data mining situations.   
 
In [12], the authors manipulate the subject identifiers to prevent information leakage, while the 
associated data remains unchanged. The method generates new subject identifiers and attaches 
them to the data, so no personally identifiable information is revealed when the data is published. 
To make the de-identification process reversible for authorised users, the parameters of the 
algorithm generating the new identifier is communicated via a secure channel to those users. A 
significant advantage of this solution is that it preserves data utility. The computational costs of 
de-identification are reasonable, but the secure communication channel for reversing the de-
identification is more expensive.  
 
While the data privacy mechanisms presented in [8], [10], [11] and [12] present a broad range of 
the research approaches published in the literature over the last ten years, with the exception of 
[12], none of these papers considered security when the data is transmitted on-line. Thus, these 
protocols are susceptible to a number of security attacks and so cannot be considered semantically 
secure. 
 
In this paper, we propose an efficient, secure protocol while also maintaining privacy.  We 
benchmark our work on all three levels: privacy, security and efficiency, against the papers in [8], 
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[10], [11] and [12]. Section IV explains the experimental setup and gives the comparative results 
across these three features. 
 
3. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
 
The architecture we propose in this paper is designed to maintain the best levels of privacy as 
discussed in the previous section, but also to improve on existing data security as well as 
efficiency by using selective encryption [13], [14] based on appropriate asymmetric and 
symmetric encryption techniques. The privacy-preserving techniques employed are Salt 
Generation, Random ID and Random Grouping along with symmetric encryption. These privacy 
techniques were all employed in the paper [12] and the model here is based on that given there. 
We show in a subsequent section that in fact, this privacy model outperforms the best competing 
privacy models in its ability to maintain data privacy.   
 
In choosing an appropriate method of securing data while in transit, we need to decide between 
systems embedded into network protocols such as SSL and TLS [15] in which a master key is 
established and subsequent uses of it are managed by the protocol, or introduce our own 
cryptographic method where the keys are owned and managed by the users. In making this 
decision, the most important feature for us was efficiency as it may be necessary in an emergency 
to send data to a small, low-resourced device. 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) allows for efficient implementation due to shorter underlying 
bit lengths key sizes (160...256 bit) when compared to RSA or DLP in finite fields (1024...4096 
bit) at an equivalent level of security [16]. This results in faster computations and lower power 
consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth savings [17].  
 
Modern security protocols such as SSL and TLS are widely used in e-commerce applications. 
These are arithmetic-intensive public-key primitives; the use of SSL increases computational cost 
of transactions by a factor of 5-7 [18] in comparison with various parameters such as throughput, 
utilization, cache sizes, file access sizes and network load on the server. In addition, several 
weaknesses of these protocols exist and are well-known including the possibility of session 
hijacking [19], [20]. Thus we opt for establishing our own protocols and key management. In fact, 
we adopt recommendations of [16] and encrypt sensitive data by using asymmetric techniques 
ECC [21] and RSA [22], and encrypt non-sensitive data by using the symmetric encryption 
technique AES for maintaining security and efficiency [23], [24]. 
 
We use the architecture in [12] as the basis of the current proposal as that architecture is the only 
one in the literature (to our knowledge) which provides a high level of data privacy and also 
tackles the issue of data security. 
 
In our model, we assume that the data to be sent contains sensitive information about individuals. 
Our objective is to maintain the privacy of these individuals by ensuring that any attacker who 
obtains the data cannot connect this sensitive information with the individual it describes.  
 
Thus, in the setup, a sender S wants to send data M to a receiver R in a secure and efficient 
manner in such a way that the privacy of the data is preserved.  S first determines which portion 
of M should be considered to be ‘sensitive’ or in need of privacy maintenance. For instance, 
patient data may be contained in the sender’s database; from this, S may select the name and 
address as sensitive data, but regard the age of the patient along with the patient’s medical 
condition as non-sensitive data. We use P to refer to sensitive data, as determined by S, and M-P 
to refer to the non-sensitive data. 
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In advance of sending the data, S and R each first establish three secret keys. Two are 
asymmetric, or public, keys based on Elliptic Curves (EC) and RSA; the third is an asymmetric 
key based on AES [23], [24] and needs to be agreed on by both parties. 
 
In addition to establishing in advance the keys to be used, R and S also establish a common 
algorithm for use in the privacy management process. This is the ‘Salt Generation’ algorithm. 
Salting is a method of adding some random digits to a plaintext before it is encrypted and is done 
in a standardized manner so that someone knowing the decryption key and the salt digits 
(unencrypted) can recover the original plaintext.  See [25] for an example of how this is 
implemented. The original purpose of salting was to prevent fast password attacks using look-up 
tables; however, the method works well as a data privacy technique as the salt digits can be used 
to ‘perturb’ sensitive data.  An advantage of salting is that it can effectively perturb the target 
string without a high computational cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Key generation process in proposed architecture 
 
The total initial interaction between S and R is described in Figure 1 where key set-up for the EC 
and RSA asymmetric keys, the symmetric key, and for the salt information is done over an 
insecure channel. The key generation is described in detail in the next sub-sections. Note that 
RSA keys are permanent while the other keys are session keys only and must be changed at each 
data transfer session. 
 
3.1. Key Generation Set-up 
 
Step 1.  RSA key set-up (permanent keys). S and R jointly select an integer nr which is the 
product pr qr of two large prime numbers. S and R now each separately choose an integer e where 
gcd((pr-1)(qr -1),e) =1 and calculate d as e-1 modulo (pr-1)(qr -1). Thus S has constructed a public 
key pair (eS, nr) and private key dS , and similarly R has public key (eR,nr) and private key dR. 
 
Step 2.  Elliptic Curve asymmetric key set-up (sessional keys). S and R jointly choose an 
elliptic curve E over a finite field GF(p), p a prime number, and a point PE on E. The prime p, the 
elliptic curve E and the point PE are the public domain parameters.  S generates a secret random 
number KS in the interval [1, p-1] and then performs an elliptic curve scalar multiplication to get 
the corresponding public key QS =KS.PE. Similarly, R generates the key pair (KR,QR). Now KS and 
KR are secret keys for S and R respectively.  
 
Step 3.  Elliptic Curve symmetric key set-up (sessional keys). To generate the symmetric key 
for use with the AES cipher, R and S use the public keys they generated in Step 2. Each can 
easily generate K= KS.KR.PE independently without the need to send any additional information 
over a channel. K is now available to each of them for use as a symmetric key for the AES 
encryption and decryption process. 
 
Since the EC keys are sessional, K is also a session key.  
  Notation: We use (K, Q) and (K , Q ) respectively to denote the EC asymmetric session keys 
for S and R for the nth session. 
Sender S Receiver R 
• Non-Symmetric key  
generation  
• Symmetric key     
generation 
• Salt generation 
algorithm 
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3.2. Encryption Process 
 
Step1. Asymmetric encryption/decryption for sensitive data P. The process for sending 
encrypted sensitive data to a receiver uses both the EC and RSA asymmetric keys established in 
Steps (1) and (2) of A. Recall that the EC keys are sessional and so new keys will be established 
when a new set of sensitive data is to be sent. 
 
 
                         KS  and eS, dS                                  KR and eR, dR 
                                P             (1)     ( . . ) 
 
                                                (2)     (. . . ) 
                                                        
                                                           (3)    ( . . ) 
 
                               Time            Time 
 
Figure 2.  A sender sends sensitive data P to a receiver 
 
In Figure 2, KS , KR and dS, dR are secret, while  eS and eR are public. To send P to R, S uses R’s 
RSA public key eR and the inverse of S’s secret key K and sends  e. K. P. When R receives 
this, he multiplies by dR to obtain dR(eR KS-1P) =  KS-1P. Then, R multiplies this by eS KR-1, and 
sends e. K. K. P to S, as shown in step (2) of Figure 2. 
 
Upon receiving this, S calculates KR-1P by decrypting with S’s RSA secret key and EC secret key 
as follows, dS (eS KR-1KS-1P) = KR-1KS-1P and KS KR-1KS-1P = KR-1P. 
 
Finally, S sends K. P  multiplied by R’s public key eR (as shown in step (3) of Figure 2), eR KR-
1P. Upon receiving this, R obtains P  by using R’s RSA and EC secret keys
  
as follows, KR dR (eR 
KR-1P) = P.  
 
In each part of the above procedure, the (sessional) secret keys of the participants are required in 
order to obtain the correct information. In order to verify that what R receives is indeed P, R now 
sends eS.P to S who checks dS.eS.P and sends a confirm message if P is actually obtained. 
 
Step 2. Symmetric encryption/decryption for non-sensitive data M-P. The AES standard for 
symmetric block ciphers offers variable plaintext block length and key length. The three key 
lengths available are: 128, 192 and 256; we chose length 128 bits for both the key length and 
plaintext length in our implementation. The AES encryption/decryption process is shown in 
http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/rijndael_ingles2004.swf.  
 
Our architecture is now described in Figure 3. The data P is first processed on the sender side by 
the privacy-enhancing protocol of [12] and the use of sessional asymmetric ECC and RSA 
encryption keys in the Privacy Enhancement stage.  
Sender S Receiver R 
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The sensitive data P is passed into the ‘Random ID’ box in Figure 3, and the salt algorithm is 
applied to it. In [12], identifying information is then hashed using a standard hash function such 
as SHA-1 [26], however, this makes it necessary for S to send R ID information separately over 
an insecure channel so that R can reconstruct the original IDs by checking hashes against a look-
up table. In the current architecture, we eliminate this because R now knows the parameters of the 
salt algorithm which permits it to reconstruct the IDs. 
 
In the final stage of the privacy-enhancement process, this salted data is sent to the ‘Random 
Grouping’ box which also accesses data from P. In this box, the data in P is classified into types 
such as ‘gender’, ‘postcode’ etc., and the data passed to the box from the ‘Random ID’ box is 
distributed into files corresponding to its type, but in a random order.  
 
Now S encrypts the contents of the ‘Random Grouping’ box, again using the sessional ECC and 
RSA asymmetric keys, while the non-sensitive data M-P is encrypted using the EC sessional 
symmetric key.  The two results are then sent to R across an insecure channel.  In Figure 3, the 
bar above P and above M-P indicates the encrypted versions of P and M-P respectively. 
 
When R receives these two pieces of data, it first decrypts both using the respective keys and then 
reconstitutes the set P by reversing the privacy techniques used. To reverse the effects of the 
‘Random Grouping’ box, the attributes defining the types are first identified. The salt algorithm is 
reversed by using the known salt algorithm and parameters. Thus, both P and M-P are finally in 
R’s hands. 
 
 In the next section, this architecture is compared with several other privacy architectures based 
on privacy, security and efficiency. 
 
                              P 
                                    
 
 
                                                                                                                            
  
                              M-P                                                                                 −  
  
                                                                  P                                                      
 
             
                                                                          M-P  −  
 
Figure 3.  Architecture of proposed privacy and security model 
 
 
 
 
 
    Privacy Enhancement 
 
                       
     
                        
 
 
 
 
Encrypt using 
ECC and                            
RSA 
asymmetric 
encryption 
Symmetric Encryption 
Sender and 
data M 
 Salt Algorithm  
Randomize ID 
Random Grouping 
 
Receiver  
Decrypt using 
ECC and RSA asymmetric 
decryption 
 
Invert Salt algorithm to 
Regroup Data 
 
Symmetric decryption M seen by Receiver 
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS OF PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE AND COMPARISON 
STUDY 
 
In this section, we compare a number of solutions in the research literature to the proposed 
solution. In order to make fair comparisons, we simulated each method based on a common data 
set but adapted the data format as needed for each method. The basis of comparison was three-
fold: privacy, security and efficiency.  
 
The tests were conducted on a machine with Intel E5200 CPU, 4GB RAM and running Fedora 
15. All results were averaged over three runs. 
 
4.1. Privacy Comparison 
 
In the tests, four recent, existing solutions [8], [10], [11] and [12] were selected for comparison 
with the proposed solution; each representing a commonly adopted privacy scheme. The one in 
[8] implements a generalization technique, [12] presents a random reordering technique, [10] 
describes a dummy data inserting technique and [11] gives details of a data transformation 
technique. Test conditions and the environment were the same for all examined solutions, 
including the same sample data set. We assumed no background-related attacks. The parameters 
were chosen based on the papers.  As the proposed method improves on security aspects of the 
existing approach of [12], the privacy performance of the two methods was expected to be 
similar. In the figures PM stands for the proposed method.  
 
The same micro table [27], a matrix containing personal information, is used in all our privacy 
tests, and it was generated from the experimental data in [8], [10] and [11]. It contains 16 patients 
(rows) and 5 attributes (columns); two of the attributes are sensitive data and three of them are 
non-sensitive. 
 
In our evaluation tests, five metrics commonly used in privacy research papers were used: data 
accuracy, identification probability (ip), overhead, entropy and distribution. Data accuracy 
measures the changes, or lack thereof, when processing the data. The identification probability is 
the probability of identifying a particular patient from a given micro table. We assume that the 
identification probability for the original data is 100%, while for the dummy data it is 0%. The 
formula used in the calculations is  
 
ip = Math. !loor %&∑ & () × ip+,()+- , × 10001 1002         (1) 
where Math.floor is the conventional truncating function that cuts the digits after the decimal 
point; MP is the number of patients and ipi is the identification probability for each patient. 
Overhead is the data added to the original data set, and includes decryption keys, dummy data and 
so on. More privacy usually entails higher overhead.  Entropy in privacy protection measures data 
uncertainty; higher entropy means that additional background information is needed to identify a 
particular person. Distribution indicates how much original information has been kept. 
 
Figure 4 shows how the identification probability changes when data accuracy is set at different 
values. The figure shows that data accuracy in the proposed method and also in that of [12] is 
always 100% regardless of identification probability, while for [8], the identification probability 
is rising linearly when data accuracy is increasing. The identification probability result for [10] 
fluctuates between 18 and 33.5 and data accuracy is stable at around 77%.  The approach of [11] 
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encrypts data and so its data accuracy is considered to be 0%. Hence, its result is not drawn in the 
graph. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Data accuracy and identification probability 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the trend when the number of patients is increasing. In this test, lower 
identification probability indicates better performance. The figure shows that the proposed 
method is able to keep the identification probability under 5% while the methods of [8] and [10] 
are significantly higher than that. Because of using encryption, [11] has a 0% identification 
probability in this test. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Number of people and identification probability % 
 
Figure 6 shows the low overhead of the proposed solution when compared to the others and 
illustrates how reducing the probability of identification can increase data overhead. Identification 
probability (ip) was calculated according to the formula presented earlier, while overhead was 
measured as the number of additional micro table data entries (units).   
 
 
                                Figure 6.  Identification probability % and overhead unit 
[10] 
[8] 
[PM][12] 
[10] 
[8] 
[PM][12] 
[11] 
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A common expectation is that better privacy entails higher overhead, and the behavior of methods 
[8] and [10] are consistent with this. The solution of [10] has a much higher overhead than the 
others. In case of algorithm [8], the overhead increases sharply when the identification probability 
drops below 10%, and it gradually decreases when the identification probability increases. 
However, it is still higher than that of solution [12] and of the proposed method; the latter two can 
keep the overhead at a constant low level, even when the identification probability is low. 
 
The overhead of [11] is only related to the number of the patients and does not involve 
identification probability, and thus it is not shown in the figure.  
 
                           
 
Figure 7.  Entropy 
 
Figure 7 shows the entropy of the processed data. Higher entropy gives higher uncertainty about 
the original data. In the test result, the proposed method is around 40% better than the second best 
solution.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Distribution 
 
Figure 8 shows the data distribution for different approaches. The solution described in [12] and 
the proposed method [PM] do not change the data. Hence, a single line starting at (18, 1) 
represents three sets of values: these two solutions and the original data. The approach proposed 
in [10] approximates the original data quite well, as indicated by the line starting at (18, 2). K-
anonymity [8] arranges the data in three groups and the actual values within each group are not 
known; this is indicated by the three shaded blocks in the figure. The solution described in [11] is 
[PM] 
[12] 
[8] 
[11] 
[10] 
[10] 
[8] 
[11] 
[PM][12][Original data] 
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also a grouping method, but it maintains the order of data within a group without revealing the 
real values; the corresponding line starts at (18, 0) in the figure. 
 
4.2. Security Comparison 
 
The architectures presented in [8], [10] and [11], which were discussed in Section IV (A), did not 
consider the security aspects of electronic data during transmission. Only [12] uses a 
cryptographic approach to maintaining the privacy level and providing security. In this section, 
we compare our proposed architecture with that in [12] on the basis of security. 
  
Data encryption. Since a part of the data being sent is considered to be sensitive, encryption is a 
recommended tool for providing both privacy and security. In our proposed architecture, we 
therefore encrypt all data before sending it to the receiver. In the interest of efficiency, since 
encryption carries an overhead cost, we propose the use of two different encryption methods, a 
cheaper one for non-sensitive data and a more expensive one for sensitive data; in general, the 
size of the sensitive data set is much smaller than that of the whole set and symmetric encryption 
is a cheaper solution for large data sets. 
 
Use of session key. If a secret key is captured by an attacker and has not been changed, the 
attacker may use the key to pretend to be someone else, or to read confidential data. (This is the 
case in the proposal of [12].) Thus, frequent changes of a secret key are an additional 
recommendation for security. The EC (asymmetric and symmetric) sessional keys described in 
Section III allow a user to reserve a single secret key but use it to generate new session keys each 
time data is to be sent to a receiver. This same session key is used in the salt generation 
component of the architecture as described in Section III and so needs to be changed each time 
the sender and receiver transmit and receive data. 
 
4.3. Efficiency Analysis of Proposed Architecture 
 
Experimental setup. The experiment was performed on a 3.20 GHz CPU with i5 processor using 
the Windows 7, 64-bit operating system. Four tests were run on 256, 512, 1024 and 2048 bits as 
the total data set size respectively. For each test, we chose sensitive data to be multiples of 64 
bits. Table 1 gives the actual numbers used as sizes of M-P and of P. We used elliptic curve and 
RSA encryption for the sensitive data P, and AES encryption for M-P. 
 
 In assessing efficiency, we need to consider the two data sets M and P, and the different 
encryption algorithms applied to them. An initial approach to preserving data privacy might be to 
apply the privacy enhancement method to the entire data set and encrypt this with the elliptic 
curve algorithm. Our aim in this section is to demonstrate that much greater efficiency can be 
achieved by designating only a part of the data set to be sensitive and separating encryption 
methods based on this. Hence, in the two tables in this section, we measure performance based on 
encryption time and speed and separate the data into P and M-P. 
 
The parameters used to assess performance are:  
 
• Encryption time (and speed) for the sensitive data set. 
• Encryption time (and speed) for the non-sensitive data set. 
 
where the encryption time (CPU time) is considered as the time for the encryption algorithm to 
produce a cipher text from the original plain text. The speed of encryption is calculated by,  
speed of encryption = (size of plain text (bits))/ (encryption time (secs)) 
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The results are discussed in the next section. 
 
Experimental analysis. When applying the architecture proposed in Section III to a set M of 
data, the two different encryption paths are used in parallel. Thus, the total time to run the 
complete process is the maximum time needed to run either one separately. 
  
From Table 1, we see that AES encryption is always faster than EC encryption, and    hence the 
smaller P is chosen to be, the faster we can run the entire protocol; the table shows that the 
smaller P is relative to M, the faster the encryption time. Table 2 shows the worst case scenario 
(most time and slowest speed) where all data is encrypted using the elliptic curve method applied 
to sensitive data.  
 
The best case scenario occurs when all data is encrypted using AES, however, in this case, no 
privacy enhancement was applied. From a privacy perspective, the research challenge here is to 
find the smallest set of sensitive data P from a given data set M as this will provide greatest 
efficiency. 
 
Table 1.  Encryption speed and time of p and m-p using a combination of EC and AES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tes
t 
No. 
Selected 
bits (P) 
Encryption 
time for P 
(secs) 
Encryption 
speed (P; 
bits/sec) 
Unselecte
d bits  
(M-P) 
Encryption 
time for M-
P (secs) 
Encryption 
speed (M-
P; bits/sec) 
1 0 0 0 256 0.00072 355556 
 
64 0.005 12800 192 0.00048 505263 
 
128 0.0062 20645 128 0.00028 457143 
 
256 0.007 36571 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 512 0.0008 640000 
 
64 0.005 12800 448 0.00077 581818 
 
128 0.0062 20645 384 0.00074 518919 
 
256 0.007 36571 256 0.00072 355556 
 
512 0.0086 59535 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1024 0.0014 731429 
 
64 0.005 12800 960 0.0010 960000 
 
128 0.0062 20645 896 0.0009 995556 
 
256 0.007 36571 768 0.00089 862921 
 
512 0.0086 59535 512 0.0008 640000 
 
1024 0.010 102400 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 2048 0.0029 706207 
 64 0.005 12800 1984 0.0025 793600 
 128 0.0062 20645 1920 0.0021 914286 
 256 0.007 36571 1792 0.00197 909645 
 512 0.0086 59535 1536 0.0018 853333 
 1024 0.010 102400 1024 0.0014 731429 
 2048 0.021 97524 0 0 0 
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Table 2. Encryption speed and time of M using EC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. PROOF OF SECURITY 
 
In this section we analyze the added security provided by our scheme which is missing in [12].  
In an online environment, when data is transmitted between two or more parties, then a number of 
attacks are possible. Here we consider three attacks which are particularly important when 
sensitive data is being transmitted.  These are the Man-In-The-Middle attack [28], the Isomorphic 
attack [29] and the Denial of Decryption attack [30]. The Man-In-The–Middle attack is designed 
to allow an attacker to intercept, read, and possibly change information being sent between two 
parties. The Isomorphic attack is designed to allow an attacker to capture the secret key of a 
receiver when a certain type of elliptic curve [31] has been chosen. The Denial of Decryption 
attack is designed to convince a sender to use an incorrect public key or to introduce garbage into 
the transmission from S to r, thus denying the receiver the opportunity to decrypt the message. 
We show that these attacks can be used against the architecture described in [12], while none 
works in our architecture. 
 
5.1. Man-In-The-Middle Attack (Key Establishment) 
 
Often during symmetric key setup a Man-In-The-Middle attack is possible. Here we show how 
our architecture prevents it. 
 
DEFINITION. Where two parties S and R exchange information over an insecure channel in 
order to establish a common key, a person can intercept and pretend to be R to S and pretend to 
be S to R, thus establishing a common key with each separately. The interceptor can then 
communicate seamlessly with R and S making them believe that they are communicating with 
each other. This is known as the ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack for key establishment. 
 
THEOREM 1. Our architecture is secure from the man-in-the-middle attack during key setup of 
the symmetric key. 
 
PROOF. In Section III, Part (A), S and R jointly choose an elliptic curve E over a finite field 
GF(p), p a prime number, and a point PE on E. The prime p, the elliptic curve E and the point PE 
are public domain parameters.  S generates a secret random number KS in the interval [1, p-1] and 
then performs an elliptic curve scalar multiplication to get the corresponding public key QS 
=KS.PE. Similarly, R generates the key pair (KR,QR). Now KS and KR are secret keys for S and R 
respectively.  
 
To generate the symmetric key for use with the AES cipher, R and S use their public keys and 
each easily generate K= KS.KR.PE independently without the need to send any additional 
information over a channel. Thus, no data needs to be exchanged. 
 
 
Test 
No. 
 
File Size in Bits  
(M) 
Encryption time 
for M (secs) 
Encryption speed 
(M; bits/sec) 
1 256 0.018 14222 
2 512 0.021 24381 
3 1024 0.034 30118 
4             2048           0.046 44522 
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5.2. Man-In-The-Middle Attack (Data Theft) 
 
The use of an ECDH [32] key exchange does not prevent an interceptor from stealing data 
because it does not authenticate the public key of receiver. Here, however, we show that our 
architecture prevents this attack.  
 
DEFINITION: Once S sends data to R, an interceptor can pretend to be R and enter into a 
protocol with S to reveal the sensitive data destined for R. This is known as a man-in-the-middle 
attack for data theft. The protocol is played out as in Figure 2.  
 
THEOREM 2. Our architecture is secure from the man-in-the-middle attack for data theft. 
 
PROOF. S wants to send sensitive data P to R. As in Figure 2, S firstly sends e. K. P to R. An 
attacker A intercepts the message  e. K. P and tries to modify it by randomly choosing an 
element α and then sending α. e. K. P encrypted with eS  to S. Thus S obtains  α. e. P by 
multiplying by K and the secret key dS. S then sends  α. e. P to R, which is intercepted by A, 
from which A gets eRP. Here, A cannot obtain the sensitive data P due to the fact that it is 
computationally infeasible to derive P from eRP.   
 
Figure 9.  Man-in-the middle attack (data theft) 
 
5.3.  Isomorphic Attack 
 
When considering this attack, we use the mathematical notations which are described in Section 
III. In the Isomorphic attack [29] an attacker A wants to get R to sign a message generated by A 
pretending that it came from S, and use this to obtain R’s secret key. We show here how this can 
be achieved when the elliptic curve E chosen has the special form  
 
y2 + axy = x3                  where,  a≠0 
 over a finite field GF(p) where p is a prime. 
 
In this attack, A wants R to sign the message M = (mx, my) chosen by A.  A obtains the public 
key, QR, of R, and generates a random number u from the set [2, p-1]. A then generates the new 
message 
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M5  =  &u7m9(mod Q), u:m;(mod Q),                                  (2) 
Now, A sends M5 to R pretending to be S and asks R to sign it. R signs using its secret key, KR, 
obtaining S’ = K. M5  =       K. (u7m9(mod Q), u:m;(mod Q)) and sends this to A. 
 Because of the special form of the elliptic curve, it has been shown [31] that the set of points of E 
is isomorphic to the set of non-zero elements of GF(p). Hence, A can re-compute this equation in 
GF(p), invert the corresponding value for M’ there and calculate KR, thus obtaining the secret key 
of R. 
 
THEOREM 3. Our architecture is secure against the Isomorphic attack. 
 
PROOF. Given that the elliptic curve E has the special form  
 
y2 + axy = x3          (3) 
 over a finite field GF(p), p a prime, A chooses the message M = (mx, my), obtains the EC 
asymmetric public nth session key, Q , of R, and generates a random number u from the set [2, p-
1]. A then generates the new message 
 
M5  =  &u7m9(mod Q ), u:m;(mod Q ),       (4)  
and sends it to R  pretending to be S, and asks R to sign it. 
 
R will only sign this message if R has a current session key in use with S. If it does not, it 
requests A for identification before it runs a new session. In this case, A will be detected.  
However, if there is still a current session key available between R and S, R signs using its 
session key, K , obtaining S′ = K . M′  and sends this to A. 
 
As described above, A can now solve this equation for R’s sessional EC asymmetric key. 
However, A is only able to use this key until it expires. If A requests new sensitive data from S it 
will be required to establish a new session key.  
 
Hence, the Isomorphic attack is not possible in our architecture. 
 
5.4. Denial of Decryption Attack 
 
During elliptic curve encryption/decryption, the sender S wants to send encrypted sensitive data P 
to the receiver R. S takes R’s public key and his identity (or personal information) as input to the 
encryption function. However, attacker A, has replaced R’s public key by someone else’s public 
key (A’s own public key or a public key of another person). S is unaware of this replacement and 
continues to execute the encryption algorithm using R’s identity and public key not belonging to 
R. Although A cannot decrypt the cipher text, neither can R. This is known as a denial of 
decryption attack on R. While we are not able to prevent such an attack, our architecture can 
detect it as shown in the next theorem. 
 
THEOREM 4. Our architecture is able to detect a Denial of Decryption Attack. 
 
PROOF.  S wants to send sensitive data to R. S sends eR.Ks-1.P to R but an 
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Figure 10.  Denial of decryption attack 
adversary A intercepts it, includes eA and then sends eA.eR.Ks-1.P to R. Now, R applies her RSA 
secret key and encrypts the message with the RSA public key of S and sends eA.eS.Ks-1. KR-1.P 
back to S. Now, S calculates eA.KR-1.P using his RSA secret key and multiplying by his ECC 
secret key. Now S uses R’s RSA public key and sends eA.eR.KR-1.P to R. So R obtains eA.P by 
applying her two secret keys.  
 
However, R cannot make sense of this message and sends eA.eS.P to S for verification (If R sends e>. P to S over an insecure channel, then A can intercept and compute e>. e>. P = P.) If S or R 
suspects A of an attack, they obtain eA and compute eA.P, verifying that A was the attacker. 
However, A can avoid detection by using a random value not his public key. In any case, such an 
attack is detected in our architecture. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
We have proposed an efficient and secure privacy-preserving architecture in an online 
environment. The proposed method addresses efficiency, security and privacy issues for online 
access of sensitive data. The main results are that the proposed method demonstrates increased 
speed of encryption/decryption and reduced overhead when compared to other recent privacy-
preserving solutions, without compromising on data privacy, accuracy or security of 
transmissions between sender and receiver. From the privacy aspect, the method proposed here 
keeps identification probability under control while maintaining data accuracy. On the other hand, 
to keep identification probability low, usually communication overhead is increased, either 
because dummy data is added or because of extra parameter processing. However, the overhead 
of the proposed method depends only on the number of patients and the number of attributes to be 
protected. The use of selective encryption in the proposed architecture provides both security and 
efficiency. We also provided proofs of security against some of the classic attacks on 
transmission of sensitive data. In future work, we plan to develop a prototype of our architecture 
to handle large data sets as well as complex data such as images. We will also consider the 
efficiencies available at the receiver by examining resource-constrained (mobile) devices and 
bandwidth limitations. 
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